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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court properly conclude that plaintiffs failed to file their 
complaint prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, even with the 
statutory tolling and additional time added into the limitations period? 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate 
court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is 
entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (set forth in Appellant's Addendum 2) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (set forth in Appellant's Addendum 3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (set forth in Appellant's Addendum 4) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment and now on appeal, 
plaintiffs attempt to avoid the statute of limitations problem by dramatically altering the 
claims in this case. Despite the allegations in the complaint and amended complaint and 
the specific causes of action, plaintiffs now argue a different injury caused by new acts of 
negligence. Contraiy to plaintiffs' arguments, this case is a straightforward application of 
a two-year statute of limitations to a set of uncontested material facts. As set forth in 
Point I of the argument section, the trial court properly applied the statute of limitations 
and the statutory tolling provisions to the uncontested facts in order to conclude that 
plaintiffs' complaint was filed four days after the statute of limitations expired. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
In their amended complaint, plaintiffs Sheila and Clayton Harper claim that 
Sheila Harper was injured by negligent medical care and treatment rendered by 
defendants, Keith H. Evans, M.D., Gary B. White, M.D., and Uintah Basin Women's 
Health, on November 15, 2002, and November 16, 2002. (R. at 9-15: a copy of plaintiffs' 
2 
amended complaint is included in the Addendum to this brief.) The allegedly negligent 
conduct arises out of two surgeries and includes the following acts: (1) the placement of 
two sutures around Mrs. Harper's ureter during her hysterectomy surgery on November 
15, 2002; (2) the removal of one of Mrs. Harper's ovaries during surgery on November 
16, 2002, which was necessary in order to remove the two allegedly negligently placed 
ureteral sutures; and (3) the removal of Mrs. Harper's appendix during either the 
November 15 or November 16, 2002 surgeries. (R. at 11) These two November surgeries 
are the only acts of negligence alleged in plaintiffs' amended complaint. (R. at 10-11) 
Indeed, the only allegations of negligence are set forth in paragraphs 7-10 in the amended 
complaint; no other allegations of negligence are provided. (R. at 10-11) 
BACKGROUND 
In the fall of 2002, Mrs. Harper presented to Dr. Evans for consultation and 
the evaluation of several health issues including excessive bleeding and cramping that she 
had been experiencing during her menstrual cycle. (R. at 10) On November 15, 2002, Dr. 
Evans and Dr. White performed a total abdominal hysterectomy and a Marshall-Marchetti 
procedure on Mrs. Haiper. (R. at 11) A Marshall-Marchetti procedure is one that 
surgically reinforces the bladder neck in order to prevent urinary incontinence or 
unintentional urine loss. Immediately after her surgery, Mrs. Harper experienced lower 
quadrant pain radiating to her left flank. (R. at 11) 
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In order to address Mrs. Harper's lower quadrant pain, an intravenous 
pyelogram (IVP)1 was performed on Mrs. Harper, which revealed a blockage in her left 
ureter. On November 16, 2002, Dr. Evans performed a laparotomy2 and removed two 
sutures from Mrs. Harper's left ureter. (R. at l l ) 3 
DOPL PROCEEDINGS 
Nearly two years after Mrs. Harper's surgery, on November 4, 2004, 
plaintiffs served a Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice Action with the Department 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing (hereinafter "DOPL"), and served the same 
upon Defendants. (R. at 29) On the same date, plaintiffs also served a Request for 
Prelitigation Panel Review with DOPL. (R. at 29) A prelitigation hearing was held, and 
on July 14, 2005, DOPL issued its Panel Opinion on plaintiffs' claims. (R. at 30) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CASE 
On January 17, 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint against only Dr. Evans and 
Uintah Basin Women's Health, alleging a cause of action for medical malpractice, 
1
 An intravenous pyelogram or IVP is a procedure that involves the intravenous 
injection of a radiopaque liquid into the urinary tract. This liquid is highly visible upon 
observation by x-ray and allows important information about blockages in the kidneys, 
bladder and ureter to be observed. 
2
 General term for abdominal surgery. 
3
 With respect to these allegations of injury and the alleged negligence of 
defendants, the above recitation of facts is taken solely from plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint. 
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general negligence and lack of informed consent as to removal of Mrs. Harper's ovary 
that occurred in the November 16, 2002 surgery. (R. at 1-6) On February 1, 2006, 
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Dr. White as a defendant and two additional 
causes of action related to the appendectomy that occurred in one of the November 2002 
surgeries. (R. at 9-15, 30) 
During the litigation, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations 
contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. (R. at 26-
87, 88-90) In defendants' motion for summary judgment, defendants set forth 12 
paragraphs of material facts to establish the relevant dates for the surgeries and plaintiffs' 
knowledge of the complications from these surgeries. (R. at 28-30) In opposing 
defendants' motion, plaintiffs did not dispute any of the material facts supporting 
defendants' motion. (R. at 92) Furthermore, plaintiffs added additional facts indicating 
that, during the November 16, 2002 surgery, Mrs. Harper was aware that her appendix 
was removed, one of her ovaries was removed, and the bladder suspension performed in 
the first surgery was undone. (R. at 92) Mrs. Harper admitted that, immediately following 
these surgeries, she had "severe difficulty urinating and chronic pelvic pain." (R. at 92) 
As discussed, plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted causes of action based on the 
removal of Mrs. Harper's ovary and appendix. (R. at 9-15) 
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In opposing defendants' motion, plaintiffs did not contest defendants' 
statement of facts and, instead, argued for the first time that the negligent medical 
treatment occurred during Mrs. Harper's post-operative follow-up care from November 
25, 2002 through April 7, 2003. (R. at 98) Despite the factual allegations and specific 
causes of action tied to the two November 2002 surgeries, plaintiffs' opposition 
memorandum stated that defendants did not breach the applicable standard of care in 
performing either of the November 2002 surgeries. (R. at 101-02) Rather, plaintiffs 
argued that defendants breached the standard of care in failing to diagnose Mrs. Harper's 
bladder condition in a timely manner. (R. at 102) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Faced with a motion for summary judgment that argued the statute of 
limitations had run on their claims, plaintiffs apparently abandoned the claims they 
asserted in their amended complaint and started fresh in order to avoid the statute of 
limitations problem. In contrast to the allegations in the amended complaint, plaintiffs 
now claim that neither the November 15 or 16, 2002 surgeries was negligently performed. 
(R. at 102) Instead, plaintiffs argued that any negligence on the part of defendants 
occurred after the surgeries and that Mrs. Harper only discovered this alleged negligence 
in April 2003 when she consulted with another doctor for continual problems she was 
experiencing in voiding her bladder dating back to the now "non-negligent" November 
2002 surgeries. (R. at 102) Now, plaintiffs argue that none of the defendants were the 
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cause of the injury to Mrs. Harper's bladder; rather, plaintiffs assert that defendants were 
negligent in failing to properly diagnose a surgical complication, which ultimately 
exacerbated the surgical complication and caused the condition to become permanent. (R. 
at 101-02) As set forth in the facts above and as set forth in plaintiffs' amended 
complaint in the Addendum to this brief, this new allegation is inconsistent with the facts 
alleged in the amended complaint. Moreover, plaintiffs' argument is inconsistent with 
Utah law on what injury is sufficient to trigger the running of the two-year statute of 
limitations for medical malpractice claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Barred by the Medical Malpractice Statute of 
Limitations. 
The trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs filed their complaint after 
the two-year statute of limitation had expired. Although plaintiffs now dispute that the 
November 2002 surgeries were negligent, plaintiffs' complaint and amended complaint 
unequivocally allege that the surgeries were allegedly negligent and that Mrs. Harper was 
immediately aware of her injuries after her surgeries. Moreover, plaintiffs did not dispute 
any of the material facts supporting defendants' motion for summary judgment. Once 
Mrs. Harper was aware of her injuries and that the injuries were related to the allegedly 
7 
negligently performed surgeries, plaintiff had the requisite knowledge of a legal injury 
and the statute of limitations commenced.4 
Although the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act establishes a two-year 
statute of limitations commencing on the date plaintiff discovers a legal injury, the Act 
contains many provisions which toll and/or extend the limitations period. Because 
plaintiffs availed themselves of two of these provisions, the following detailed time line is 
helpful to understand when the limitations period ended. 
Event Date Effect on Statute of Limitation 
1 st Surgery 
2nd Surgery 
Statute of Limitation 
Starts 
Plaintiffs Serve Notice 
of Intent 
Plaintiffs Request for 
Panel Review 
Pre-Lit. Hearing 
Nov. 15,2002 
Nov. 16,2002 
Nov. 17,2002 
Nov. 4, 2004 
Nov. 4, 2004 
July 7, 2005 
No effect on statute 
Mrs. Harper experiences complications 
from surgery and undergoes second surgery 
to correct problems arising from the first 
surgery 
Based on Mrs. Harper's knowledge of her 
injuries and their connection to the 
surgeries, the two year statute of limitations 
starts on her claims 
Provides additional 120 days from the date 
the Notice is served in which to file 
complaint (Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8) 
Request tolls limitations period until 63 
days after DOPL Issues Opinion (Utah 
Code Ann. §78-14-12(3)) ' 
No effect on statute 
4
 See Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979); Duerden v. Utah Valley 
Hospital. 663 F. Supp. 781, 785-786 (D. Utah 1987). 
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DOPL Issues Opinion 
DOPL issues its 
Certificate of 
Compliance 
Tolling ends 
Statute Expires 
Plaintiffs file their 
complaint 
July 14, 2005 
July 18,2005 
Sep. 15,2005 
Jan. 13,2006 
Jan. 17,2006 
Limitations period tolled for 63 days from 
this date 
No effect on statute 
Plaintiffs have 120 days to file their 
complaint (Notice of Intent provision) 
As the table above indicates, plaintiffs missed the deadline by four days. 
Plaintiffs, however, argue that the trial court erred in its calculations. 
Plaintiffs argued to the trial court and in their brief (at p. 24-25) that the provisions under 
section 78-14-8 (120 day extension) and section 78-14-12(3)(a) (tolling plus 63 days) are 
added to the remaining days of the limitations period after the notice of intent is filed and 
then the total number of days starts to run after DOPL issues its opinion. This argument 
is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and the application of the statute by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
Section 78-14-8 provides that if the Notice of Intent is served less than 90 
days before the expiration of the statute of limitation then the time for commencing the 
action "shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice."5 Plaintiffs 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (emphasis added). 
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however, ignore the final words of the statutory provision and combine the 120 days with 
the remaining days at end of the limitations period. Accordingly, plaintiffs' argument is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute, which provides that plaintiff receives an 
extension of only 120 days from the date of service of the notice. 
By the express terms of the statute, the 120 days is extended from the date 
of service of the notice.6 In this case, the notice was filed and served on November 4, 
2004. Nothing in the statute provides that the 120 days runs from November 17, 2004, as 
plaintiffs argue or is combined with those extra days when the limitations period is tolled. 
In Forbes v. St. Mark's Hospital, the Utah Supreme Court calculated the limitations period 
by applying the 120 days from the date the notice was served, not the end of the 
limitations period.7 According to plaintiffs, the Court in Forbes should have added the 
120 days to end of the limitations period, which ended on November 27, 1984. Instead, 
the Court correctly applied the statutory provision as running from the date the notice was 
served.8 
Thus, plaintiffs' argument that they were entitled to an additional 13 days 
(the difference between November 4 and November 17 when the limitations period 
6
 See id. 
7
 See Forbes, 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988) (adding 120 days from November 
20, 1984 to extend limitations period to March 20, 1985). 
8
 See id. 
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ended) is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and is inconsistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's application of the statute. Because plaintiffs are not entitled to the 
13 days between the date when they filed their notice and the expiration of the two-year 
limitations period, their argument that the statute of limitations ran on January 26, 2006 is 
off by 13 days. When the statutory provisions are properly applied, the trial court 
correctly determined the statute of limitations expired on January 13, 2007 - four days 
before plaintiffs filed their complaint. 
II. Plaintiffs Knew of the Injuries and Negligence and Failed to Timely 
File Their Action. 
In this case, plaintiffs knew and specifically alleged causes of action based 
on negligence that occurred in the November surgeries. Plaintiffs alleged a lack of 
informed consent as to these surgical procedures. In addition, plaintiffs alleged a general 
negligence claim which, based on the allegations in the amended complaint, also related 
only to the November surgeries. Having missed the statute of limitations, plaintiffs now 
assert that the November surgeries were not negligently performed, but rather the doctors' 
negligence occurred in the post-operative care. Plaintiffs' new allegation is fatally 
deficient on three points: (A) plaintiffs knew of the alleged negligence in the November 
surgery and alleged actual injuries resulting from the November surgeries; (B) plaintiffs 
are improperly attempting to split their claims in contravention of Utah's one-action rule; 
and (C) plaintiffs' pleadings fail to allege a failure to diagnose claim. 
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The fact that plaintiff may not have been aware of the full extent of her 
bladder injury until April 2003 does not toll the statute of limitations when plaintiffs were 
aware of some actual injury and that the presently existing injury was related to the * 
November surgery.9 Furthermore, the fact that plaintiffs believed the symptoms were 
temporary and only later learned that the condition was permanent is not a sufficient to 
delay the running of the statute of limitations. 
A. Plaintiffs Alleged Actual Injury Related to Surgical Procedures. 
Plaintiffs satisfied the legal injury test set forth in Foil because they claimed 
actual injury that stemmed from the two surgical procedures which they asserted were 
negligently performed. To the extent they now claim a permanent bladder injury, the fact 
remains that this injury arose from the surgical procedures and manifested itself 
immediately after the surgeries. It is undisputed that Mrs. Harper underwent surgical 
procedures, some of which related to her bladder. It is also undisputed that the injuries to 
her bladder manifested themselves immediately after the first surgery and further 
complications were apparent immediately after the second surgery. In their brief and at 
summary judgment, plaintiffs have never contested that Mrs. Harper knew of the 
symptoms related to her bladder condition immediately after both surgeries and that these 
injuries were related to possible negligence with respect to the manner in which the 
9
 See, e.g., Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996) (once some harm 
is manifest, the statute of limitations begins to run); Duerden, 663 F. Supp at 785-86. 
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surgeries were performed, including the need to remove the two sutures which 
necessitated the second surgery.10 
In addition to the bladder injury, plaintiffs also alleged injury for lack of 
infomied consent as to two of the surgical procedures. It is undisputed that plaintiffs 
were aware of both of these surgical procedures immediately after the surgeries. The lack 
of infomied consent is not continuing in nature. As set forth in plaintiffs* complaint and 
amended complaint, each act of alleged negligence was tied to the November surgical 
procedures. 
Applying the Foil test, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiffs 
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware of her actual injuries and the 
relationship to negligence.11 In Medved, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the rule with 
respect to when a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers immediate actual 
injuries and also unknown possible future injuries. The Utah Supreme Court held that a 
plaintiff must assert a claim for the unknown future injuries when those injuries are 
accompanied by immediate actual injuries.12 Like Medved. plaintiffs, in this case, alleged 
10
 See R. at 28-30, 92; see also Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 14, wherein they allege a 
breach of the standard of care starting in November, 2002 and continuing through April, 
2003. 
11
 See Medved v. Glenn, 2005 UT 77. ^[17. 125 P.3d 913. 
12
 See Medved, 2005 UT 77 at [^14 (plaintiff cause of action accrued where failure 
to diagnose cancer caused immediate injury and also potential for cancer to recur). 
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immediate actual injuries, in the form of the un-consented to surgical procedures, and also 
the complications from the surgeries. Plaintiffs now allege the complications resulted in 
future harm in the form of a permanent bladder injury; however, "once some harm is 
manifest, the limitations period begins to run on all claims, present and future/'13 
A federal district court applied the Foil test to a similar set of facts and 
concluded the plaintiffs claims were barred by the statute of limitations.14 In Duerden, 
the plaintiff was improperly catheterized after giving birth to her second child. Because 
of the improper catheter placement, the plaintiffs bladder became distended and she had 
difficulty voiding her bladder.15 During follow up care, however, the plaintiffs doctors 
informed her that her problems were temporary and that her bladder would return to 
normal.16 Her condition, however, did not improve and she continued to have difficulty 
urinating. Eventually, a subsequent doctor diagnosed her as having a permanent and 
untreatable bladder injury. The plaintiff commenced litigation for medical malpractice 
over three years after the negligent placement of the catheter.17 
13
 Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). 
14
 See Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital 663 F. Supp. 781 (D. Utah 1987). 
15
 See id. at 782. 
16
 See id. 
17
 See id. 
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Because the plaintiff was told that the catheter was negligently placed 
immediately after it happened, the district court determined the second prong of Foil -
knowledge of negligence - was satisfied. Thus, the district court focused on the first 
prong of the Foil test. Like plaintiff in this case, the plaintiff in Duerden claimed her 
injury was for the permanent bladder condition, which she only learned of well after the 
negligent act. Relying on Reiser v. Lohner,18 the district court in Duerden discussed when 
the plaintiff discovers an injury under the first prong of Foil: "the statute begins to run 
upon acquisition of such knowledge, whether or not the injured party is aware of the 
extent of her injury, the actual malady suffered, or the permanent nature of her 
symptoms."19 The district court concluded that plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of her 
injury at the time of the negligent act, at which point the plaintiff believed her symptoms 
were only temporary, and the statute of limitations began to run at that point with respect 
to all injuries the plaintiff may have sustained from the negligent act.20 
This case is factually similar to Duerden and the federal district court's 
analysis and reliance on Reiser is applicable to the claims at bar. Under Duerden, once 
18
 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. Rogers, 
763P.2d771 (Utah 1988). 
19
 I d at 784. 
20
 See id. at 785-86; see also Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980) 
(plaintiff was aware of complications from injection during dental procedure which were 
sufficient to trigger statute of limitations). 
15 
Mrs. Harper is aware of some harm, regardless of whether she believes it is temporary or 
permanent, the limitations period commences. Here, plaintiffs advance the same 
arguments as in Duerden, i.e., the limitations period does not start until the injury 
becomes permanent. Plaintiffs' argument, however, was rejected in both Duerden and 
Reiser. Because plaintiffs have not contested the knowledge of some injury and the 
relation of the injury to possible negligence, the limitations period commenced when 
plaintiffs first became aware of the injury. Thus, the trial court properly concluded the 
limitations period started on November 17, 2002. 
R Because Plaintiffs Alleged Actual Injuries Arising Out of the November 
Surgeries, Plaintiffs Cannot Split These Claims from a Subsequent and 
Related Claim In Order to Avoid the Statute of Limitations. 
The gravaman of plaintiffs' argument on appeal is that surgical procedures 
were non-negligent, and the negligence giving rise to her claims did not occur until 
defendants failed to diagnose the bladder retention problem. Plaintiffs' new theory is 
belied by the facts and the allegations in plaintiffs' amended complaint. Plaintiffs 
asserted two causes of action for lack of informed consent. Plaintiffs now realize these 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations, have apparently withdrawn these claims, 
and have now asserted new causes of action.21 
21
 See, e.g., Collins v. Wilson. 1999 UT 56, ^9, 984 P.2d 960 (discussing that 
plaintiff changed theory of case to eliminate lack of informed consent claims and to 
pursue only claims related to allegedly negligently performed post-operative care). 
16 
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs had a viable claim for the failure to 
diagnose the post-operative bladder condition, Utah's one-action rule precludes plaintiffs 
from splitting this cause of action from the other causes of action.22 Furthermore, Utah's 
appellate courts have consistently found that a plaintiffs cause of action commences once 
a plaintiff has knowledge of an actual injury and any future injuries, including injuries 
which are remote and only possible, must be asserted at the same time as the actual 
injuries. Under the one-action rule, the limitations period on all of a plaintiff s causes of 
action starts when a plaintiff first learns of an actual injury and its relation to possible 
negligence, regardless of whether future harm is possible. 
As applied in Medved, the Foil test also looks to Utah's adoption of the 
"one-action rule."23 Under the one action rule, "once a plaintiff suffers actionable injury 
[i.e. the lack of informed consent and/or complications from the surgeries], she is entitled 
to recover damages not only for harm already suffered, but also for that which will 
probably result in the future."24 Furthermore, "a plaintiffs failure to seek future damages 
in such a situation may very well preclude any subsequent attempts at recovery."25 
22
 See Medved, 2005 UT 77 a t f !4 , 
23
 See Medved. 2005 UT 77 at ^ 14. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. 
17 
Mrs. Harper underwent a surgical procedure on November 15, 2002, which 
included the Marshall-Marchetti procedure on her bladder. It is undisputed that she had 
complications of which she was acutely aware immediately after the first surgery.26 A test 
revealed a blockage of her ureter. Mrs. Harper underwent a second surgery on November 
16, 2002 to remove two sutures in her ureter from the first surgery. It is undisputed that 
she was aware of the second surgery, why it was needed, and what transpired during this 
second surgery, i.e. the removal of the sutures in her ureter. After this second surgery, 
however, she continued to have problems voiding her bladder. It is undisputed that she 
was aware of this complication and its relationship to the prior surgeries, which she 
alleged to be negligent in her complaint. 
In Collins v. Wilson, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that facts similar 
to the allegations above, i.e., a plaintiffs awareness of complications after surgery, are 
sufficient to trigger the limitations period, stating: "There is evidence that [plaintiff] has 
the requisite 'awareness of physical injury' almost immediately following the initial 
surgery."27 Based on her awareness of her actual injuries and the relationship of the 
26
 R. at 92, wherein plaintiffs state: "During the days and weeks following the two 
operations, Mrs. Harper has severe difficulty urinating and chronic pelvic pain." 
27
 Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, f 18, 984 P.2d 960 (determining that plaintiffs 
awareness of complications after surgery and that fact that medical problems were 
contrary to his expectations were sufficient to put plaintiff on notice of legal injury). 
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injuries to the surgery, plaintiffs had the requisite knowledge of the legal injury with 
respect to the bladder injury. 
In addition to the symptoms related to her bladder injury, plaintiffs also 
alleged a lack of informed consent as to both surgeries. It is undisputed that plaintiffs 
were aware of the removal of the appendix and her ovary immediately after the surgery.2 
Through their lack of informed consent cause of action, plaintiffs alleged the requisite 
knowledge of harm and identifiable actual injury. As such, the statute of limitations on 
the lack of informed consent claim also began to run immediately after the second 
November surgery. 
Plaintiffs are now trying to divorce themselves from their original claims 
which they recognize are hopelessly time barred. In other words, plaintiffs realize the 
lack of informed consent claims cannot be saved; however, plaintiffs, by changing their 
allegations, are trying to preserve their claims with respect to the bladder injury. Under 
Seale and Medved, however, Utah's one-action rule precludes a plaintiff from splitting 
these claims. Moreover, because Mrs. Harper was aware of some harm to her bladder, 
Seale and Medved require plaintiffs to assert this claim in conjunction with the lack of 
informed consent claims. In Seale and Medved, the possibility of future harm was more 
remote and speculative. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court required the possible 
28
 R. at 92. 
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future injury to be asserted with the actionable existing injury. In this case, plaintiffs 
cannot save the bladder claim by abandoning the lack of informed consent claims and 
altering the alleged negligence acts. The trial court properly saw through plaintiffs' 
recharacterization of their claims and alleged acts of negligence and determined the 
claims were asserted after the limitations period had expired on the claims. 
C. Plaintiffs Failed to Allege Any Subsequent Negligent Acts in the 
Amended Complaint. 
This Court should not allow plaintiffs to change their allegations in 
midstream in order to avoid the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs' amended complaint 
alleged negligence tied to the two surgical procedures. It provided no other allegation 
that would put a party on notice of additional claims. 
Plaintiffs' new claim is a failure to diagnose the cause of her inability to 
completely void her bladder. Plaintiffs now claim neither of the surgeries was negligently 
performed; however, the amended complaint indicates otherwise. Plaintiffs amended the 
complaint to add the other surgeon, Dr. White, who was involved with the surgical 
procedures but was not involved in any of Mrs. Harper's post-operative care. A review of 
the allegations of the amended complaint indicates that each of plaintiffs' causes of action 
is tied to the two November surgeries, including the allegations that Dr. Evans and Dr. 
White failed to obtain informed consent for two of the surgical procedures that were 
performed. No allegation of a failure to diagnose is alleged. Furthermore, if the 
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allegations related only to post-operative care, Dr. White would not have needed to be 
added as a defendant in the action. 
In adopting the discovery rule in Foil, the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
the need for a rule that allowed a plaintiff ample time to discover the nature and source of 
an injury while balancing the legislature's intent to not allow stale claims to be asserted 
against healthcare providers. The Utah Supreme Court stated: "the law ought not to be 
construed to destroy a right of action before a person even becomes aware of the 
existence of that right."29 Such concerns are not present in this case. It is undisputed that 
plaintiffs were immediately aware of the problems with the first surgery and the need for 
a second surgery to remove sutures in her ureter. Furthermore, it undisputed that 
plaintiffs were immediately aware of the complications she suffered immediately after the 
second surgery. Indeed, plaintiffs filed their Notice of Intent within the two-year 
statutory period and received an additional 6 months in which to file the complaint. 
The trial court summarized it best, stating: "Why do you guys that sue 
medical defendants screw around with the tail end of these statutes? Why do you wait till 
the seventh day before it runs?"30 In granting defendants' motion, the trial court got it 
right: "The legislature's enacted this, I guess to insulate the doctors from extended periods 
29
 Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979). 
30
 (R. at 165, p. 18) 
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of liability and malpractice insurance, and the policy is their business. But the law is the 
law and you have two years plus these exceptions. And I think the way I've understood 
this, I'm going to grant the defendants' motion; the case will be dismissed."31 This Court 
should affirm the trial court's correct application of two-year statute of limitations to the 
facts of this case. 
III. The Continuing Negligence Rule Has No Application to the Facts of 
This Case. 
Under plaintiffs' revised allegations, plaintiffs alleged that the November 
2002 surgeries were properly performed, but Dr. Evans failed to diagnose Ms. Harper's 
bladder condition from November 2002 until April 2003. Assuming plaintiffs had a 
viable cause of action for Dr. Evans' failure to diagnose and treat the bladder condition, 
this case is no different from other cases of failure to diagnose. As such, the Foil test 
would govern the case. Plaintiffs argue that Peteler v. Robison should govern this case 
and the continuing negligence rule applies to the case. In Peteler,32 Utah did adopt a 
negligent course of treatment rule. The negligent course of treatment is different from a 
continuing negligence rule.33 Utah has not adopted a continuing negligence rule. 
31
 (R. at 165, p. 19) 
32
 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932). 
33
 See Collins, 1999 UT 56 at t i l n.9. 
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Furthermore, the facts and circumstances of Peteler do not warrant its 
application to this case. In Peteler, the Utah Supreme Court's rule was driven largely by 
defendant's concealment of his own negligence. Furthermore, the defendant committed a 
series of negligent acts, rather than omissions, e ^ failing to diagnose, which warranted 
extending the limitations period to cover each negligent act. Finally, in contrast to this 
case, the series of negligent acts were related to treating the same condition and thus 
established a negligent course of treatment. The case at bar is more like Collins v. 
Wilson, which the Utah Supreme Court distinguished from Peteler.34 In this case, 
plaintiff now asserts the initial surgeries were non-negligent, and it was only the failure to 
properly diagnose the bladder retention that was negligent. Plaintiff cannot have it both 
ways. Either the surgeries were negligent and then a negligent course of treatment 
existed, or the surgeries were not negligent and no course of treatment exists. 
Although Utah has not adopted the continuous treatment rule, the Utah 
Supreme Court has noted that discovery as set forth in Foil is applicable where the 
plaintiff learns of the legal injury during treatment.35 In other words, because plaintiffs 
alleged both lack of informed consent and knowledge of the bladder symptoms during the 
continuing treatment, the discovery rule governs rather than the last day of treatment. In 
34
 See Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, |10 . 984 P.2d 960. 
35
 See id. 
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this case, as set forth in points I & II, supra, plaintiffs possessed all of the requisite 
knowledge of the injuries on November 17, 2002. Moreover, like Collins, this Court need 
not decide whether Utah should adopt a continuing negligence rule in this case. The Utah 
Supreme Court's analysis in Collins is applicable to this case, and plaintiffs have failed to 
indicate why this Court should abandon the long line of cases following the Foil test. 
Under Collins and applying the Foil test, plaintiffs possessed the requisite knowledge of a 
legal injury during the allegedly negligent course of treatment. As such, the limitations 
period commenced before the end of allegedly negligent course of treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The undisputed facts demonstrate 
that plaintiffs' claims are time barred. 
DATED this \° day of April, 2007. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
ROBERT G. WRIGHT / / 
BRANDON B. HOBBS/ / 
ZACHARY E. P E T E R ^ N 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this j~7 day of April, 2007, to the following: 
Cory B. Mattson 
Cory B. Mattson, LC 
9677 South 700 East, #D 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
G\EDSI\DOCS\09828\0685\J56551 WPD 
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ADDENDUM 
(Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R. at 9-15)) 
FILED 
^ DISTR.'CT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
FEB 01 :J ;S 
EE, CLERK 
DEPUTY 
Cory B Mattson (#9292) 
Cory B Mattson, LC 
9677 South 700 East, #D 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Telephone (801) 495-0802 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHEILA HARPER, and CLAYTON HARPER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
KEITH H. EVANS, M.D., GARY B. WHITE, 
M.D., and UINTAH BASIN WOMEN'S 
HEALTH, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Civil No. 060800008 
Plaintiffs Sheila and Clayton Harper complain and allege for cause of action against 
Defendants Keith H. Evans, M.D. and Uintah Basin Women's Health as follows: 
JURISDICTION, VENUE AND PARTIES 
1. The acts upon which this Complaint is based occurred entirely or substantially in 
Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
2. The amount claimed in this case exceeds $20,000, exclusive of costs. 
3. Plaintiffs Sheila and Clayton Harper are individuals who reside in Duchesne 
County, State of Utah. Sheila Harper and Clayton Harper are lawfully married as wife and 
husband. 
4. Defendant Keith H. Evans, M.D. is a health care provider who provided 
treatment to Sheila Harper during all times alleged herein in Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
5. Defendant Uintah Basin Women's Health is believed to be a clinic which employs 
defendant Keith H. Evans, M.D. and which is located in Roosevelt, Duchesne County, State of 
Utah. At all times mentioned herein, defendant Keith Evans, M.D. is believed to have been an 
employee and/or agent of Uintah Basin Women's Health. 
6. Plaintiffs have complied with Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1979) and served upon 
the defendant health care providers a Notice of Intent to Commence a Negligence Action. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 to 14, this matter was brought before a pre-litigation 
panel of the Department of Commerce, Division for Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
which issued a Certificate of Compliance on July 18, 2005. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. In the Fall of 2002, Sheila Harper consulted Dr. Evans about excessive bleeding 
and cramping during her menstrual cycle. He examined her and recommended that she undergo a 
total abdominal hysterectomy. He also recommended that she undergo a Marshall-Marchetti 
procedure on her bladder after he inquired about her urinary function. During her consultations 
with Dr. Evans, Sheila Harper told him that she wanted to keep her ovaries and that he should 
not surgically remove her ovaries. Dr. Evans told her that he would not remove her ovaries. 
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8. On or about November 15, 2002, Sheila Harper underwent a total abdominal 
hysterectomy, and Marshall-Marchetti procedure performed at Uintah Basin Medical Center by 
Dr. Keith Evans and Dr. Gary White. Following the surgery, Sheila Harper suffered from left 
lower quadrant pain radiating to her left flank. An intravenous pyelogram (IVP) revealed a 
blockage of the left ureter and hydronephrosis on the left side. 
9. On November 16, 2002, Sheila Harper was taken back into surgery by Dr. 
Evans. He performed a laparotomy during which he discovered that there were two sutures 
around the ureter. The sutures were removed and a renal stent was placed. Dr. Evans also 
performed an oopherectomy — removing Sheila Harper's ovaries. 
10. Since the second surgery, Sheila has continued to have significant problems 
including, inter alia, difficulty voiding her bladder, requiring self-catheterization, and pain. She 
has undergone subsequent surgery to retrieve an ovarian remnant and to remove scar tissue from 
the initial hysterectomy. 
11. Defendants were negligent such that they failed to observe the applicable 
standard of care in their treatment of Sheila Harper. Defendants' breach of the standard of care 
was the proximate cause of her damages. 
12. Due to Defendants' negligence, Sheila and Clayton Harper have suffered the 
following damages: 
a. Medical Bills: Sheila Harper has incurred past, present, and future 
medical expenses as a result of Defendants' negligence; 
b. Lost Wages and Earning Capacity: Sheila Harper has suffered lost 
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income, earning capacity, and household services. 
c. Permanent Physical Disfigurement and Deformity: Sheila Harper has 
suffered permanent physical disfigurement and deformity as a result of defendants' negligence. 
d. Physical mental, and emotional impairment: Sheila Harper has 
suffered physical, mental, and emotional impairment and disability caused by defendants' 
negligence. 
e. General Damages: Sheila Harper has suffered extreme pain, discomfort, 
and loss of enjoyment of life as a result of the Defendant's negligence. 
f. Loss of Consortium: Plaintiff Clayton Harper has suffered a loss of 
consortium with his wife and companion, Sheila Harper. 
13. At all times mentioned herein, defendant Keith H. Evans, M.D. was an 
employee or agent of defendant Uintah Basin Women's Health acting within the course and 
scope of his employment or agency. As such, Uintah Basin Women's Health is responsible for 
his negligent acts via respondeat superior liability. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Defendants' Negligence -
14. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs into this cause of action. 
15. Defendants had a duty to observe the applicable standard of care in their 
treatment of Sheila Harper. The Defendants breached the standard of care in multiple respects 
which caused serious and permanent injury to the Plaintiffs as detailed above. 
16. Defendants' negligence by their failure to observe the standard of care was the 
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proximate cause of the damages and injuries to the Plaintiffs as alleged above. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Failure to Obtain Informed Consent: Oopherectomy -
17. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs into this cause of action. 
18. Defendants had a duty to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent for the 
surgical removal of her ovaries. Defendants failed to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent and 
then performed an oopherectomy to remove her ovaries, contrary to her express directions given 
prior to the procedure. 
19. Defendants' failure to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent was the 
proximate cause of her damages as alleged above. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Failure to Obtain Informed Consent: Appendectomy -
20. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs into this cause of action. 
21. Defendants had a duty to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent for the 
surgical removal of her appendix. Defendants failed to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent 
and then performed an appendectomy without her prior consent. 
22. Defendants' failure to obtain Sheila Harper's informed consent was the 
proximate cause of her damages as alleged above. 
\\ 
\\ 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Battery: Appendectomy -
23. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs into this cause of action. 
24. Defendants intentionally committed an offensive and harmful touching of Sheila 
Harper's person by performing an appendectomy without her prior consent and without 
informing her that they intended to perform such surgical procedure. 
25. Defendants' intentional, harmful, and offensive touching caused Sheil Harper 
damages as alleged above. 
JURY DEMAND 
25. Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial of all issues in this case. 
DEMAND FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For an award of general damages, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. For past and future medical and incidental expenses, in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
3. For other economic and out-of-pocket damages, in an amount to be proven 
at trial. 
4. For costs of court. 
5. For prejudgment interest on the damages assessed by the verdict of the 
jury, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1991), as amended. 
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6. For such other relief as the Court deems just in the premises. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2006. 
Plaintiffs Address: 
657 William Remington Dr. 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
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